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 Minority Report—based on a

Philip K. Dick short story—is
set in 2054.
 In the movie, the “precrime”

unit of the police department
arrests (pre-)criminals based
on “foreknoweldge.”
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 The foreknowledge is

generated by three
“precogs”—psychics who
can see the future.

 Ideally, they agree on what

this future looks like; if not, a
“minority report” is
generated.
3

 Part of what makes the premise

compelling is that it synthesizes
utopian and dystopian elements:
 The utopian is that crime has largely

been eliminated; would-be criminals
are stopped before their
transgressions.
 But the dystopian is two-fold: both

with regards to a pessimistic account
of free will, coupled with statesanctioned surveillance.
4

 Dialing back from the

“foreknowledge” in Minority
Report, we already know that
a range of features predict
criminality.
 It is important to emphasize

that these predictors are
fallible, which is to say that
the correlations are not
perfect.
5

 Some of the correlates of criminality

we might call social. These include
things like:
1. age (younger = higher disposition)
2. marital status (single = higher
disposition)
3. education (lower = higher disposition)
 Actuarial tables make these trends

unambiguous, but what are the
implications for individuals?

 Others we might call biological. These

include:

race (some minorities = higher).
2. genetics (“warrior gene”; alleles that
produce monoamine oxidase A
(MAOA), an enzyme that affects the
neurotransmitters dopamine,
norepinephrine, and serotonin).
1.

 Again, not perfect predictors.

 Enter psychopaths, who manifest a

developmental disorder that often leads to
persistent antisocial behavior; they
comprise ~1% of the general population,
but ~15% of the prison population.
 Psychopaths are notoriously domineering,

exploitative of others, and deficient—or
lacking—in social emotions like guilt,
remorse, and empathy.
 They are also hyper-aggressive, predatory,

and recidivistic.

 Many results establish neurochemical bases
1.

2.

3.

4.

of psychopathy:
The neurotransmitter noradrenaline plays
an important role in the deficits associated
with psychopathy.
Administering noradrenaline antagonists
reduces impact of adverse decisionmaking cues.
Amygdala activity in also reduced by
administration of noradrenaline
antagonists.
Differences between psychopaths and
non-psychopaths on cortisol function.

 And others; criminologists

have made much progress
understanding social and
biological correlates of
criminality.
 But a key ethical question,

already foreshadowed, is
what to make of these
increased propensities.

 Say, for example, that in virtue

of bio-/social/neural predictors,
some individual were 33%
more likely to commit crime
than some 3% baseline: 4%
likely to commit crime.
 Say that this increased

propensity pertained to some
already-fraught category, like
race.

 It’s very implausible that we are

going to “pre-arrest” (or “pre”anything, like probation,
surveillance, etc.) this sort of
person. And for a range of reasons:
 1. statistical (i.e., +33% or 4% total

is too low);
 2. ethical (i.e., racist, antiindividualist, etc.); or
 3. legal (Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth
Amendments).

 But what is the case were

different? Take the psychopath,
and suppose we have 90%
probability that this person will
commit crimes.
 Further suppose that we know

who the psychopaths are from the
revised psychopathy checklist
(PCL-R).
 Would interventions be

appropriate here? If so, which?

 My intuitions are substantially

different in this case, for a
couple reasons:
1.

The statistics are far more
predictive.

2.

The predictor is less morally
fraught; psychopaths are bad
people.

 But, I still have worries about

what the interventions could be.
 Pre-arrest has to be out. Even

90% isn’t 100%, but, if it were,
the due process considerations
are substantial.

 What about pre-probation? More

promising. Special tribunals to
pre-authorize? (Or bad: FISA,
torture warrants, etc.?)

 So far, we have talked about

neuroprediction, which would
identify criminals before crimes
occur.
 But we can also talk about

neuromitigation, which would go to
sentencing after crimes have
occurred.

 A Virginia man led a completely

normal life, happily married with
children, stable job.
 Around age 40, his behavior changed,

including lewd treatment of women, an
obsession with pedophilia, and abuse
of his stepdaughter.
 He was arrested and convicted; before

sentencing, he complained of
headaches, got an MRI, and was
diagnosed with tumor in right frontal
lobe of orbifrontal cortex—a region
tied to judgment, impulse control, and
social behavior.

 And so this portends another important

frontier in neurolaw.

 What do we do with such cases? How do

they affect our conceptions of free will,
moral responsibility, criminal/civil
liability, and so on?

 Can/should these cases be slotted into

existing legal doctrine? Are they fully
exculpatory (cf., insanity, but with civil
commitment a possibility)? Or partially
(cf., diminished capacity)?

